— Md. Muddassir Quamar

(There are areas in the world that remain beset by conflicts. West Asia is one such region that has been in the grip of conflicts at least since the mid-20th century. The escalation after the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war further upended the political landscape of the region. What are the prospects for containing the conflicts? How does regional instability affect India’s interests? We will feature a series of articles on major conflicts in West Asia, exploring the root cause of the conflicts, the reasons behind the recent escalation, and its effect on India’s interests.)

Ever since the outbreak of the war in the Gaza Strip in the wake of the 7 October 2023 attack by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Israel, the responses of the Gulf Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, have evoked considerable curiosity. Many view their response as surprising given their economic and political clout that can presumably be used to put pressure on the US and Israel to bring an immediate ceasefire. Likewise, they have been accused of going soft on condemnation of Israeli actions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and not doing enough for the Palestinian cause.

Indeed, before the outbreak of the crisis in the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian issue did not feature as a priority in Gulf states’ regional and foreign policy. The Gulf-Israel rapprochement led to the signing of the Abraham Accords with Bahrain and the UAE normalising relations with Israel in 2020. Saudi Arabia, too, was considering and weighing potential normalisation with Israel with a diplomatic push by the Biden administration.

Amidst these developments, the Hamas attack came as a shock, with the Gulf states forced to reconsider their positions. Notably, they have avoided any reflexive response and adopted a predictable reaction condemning Israeli actions, expressing support for the Palestinian cause and taking a gradual and pragmatic position, keeping their options open, emphasising the need for finding a diplomatic solution and avoiding geopolitical entanglements.

Saudi Arabia’s response acquires significance, given its stature and influence in the Arab and Islamic world. Moreover, its historic rivalry with Iran and the proactive Iranian response to the crisis puts it in a complicated situation.

Iran’s proactive condemnation of Israel and its support for militant groups, such as Hamas, Hezbollah and Houthis, has historically been compared to Saudi Arabia’s more pragmatic and diplomatic approach. The unfolding situation since October 2023 has put the Saudi position and response under greater scrutiny in comparison to the Iranian response.

Notwithstanding the historic Saudi-Iranian rivalry rooted in geopolitical and sectarian competition and tensions, Saudi Arabia would prefer to avoid a situation wherein it will be forced to choose a side between Israel and Iran, especially as King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have, over the past decade, carefully worked towards prioritising socioeconomic reforms and avoiding geopolitical entanglements.

Saudi Arabia and Iran have, for a long time, engaged in geopolitical competition and rivalry. The Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the Iranian quest for leadership of the Islamic world directly challenged the Saudi claim over the same. Ayatollah Khomeini’s calls for the export of the Iranian revolution prompted Saudi Arabia and its Arab Gulf allies to form the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981 and extend support to Iraq during the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran war.

Although much has changed since the 1980s, and Iran and Saudi Arabia did briefly enter into a rapprochement in the 1990s, the controversy over Iran’s nuclear program and the emergence of the Shi’a Crescent derailed the process, as Saudi Arabia feared the Iranian quest for regional hegemony.

The expansion of the Iranian sphere of influence into Lebanon with the rise of Hezbollah, the Palestinian territories due to the Iranian support for Hamas, Syria due to the proximity with the Assad regime, and finally, Iraq after the 2003 US attack and the dismantling of Baathist regime forced Saudi King Abdullah to famously call on the US to “cut off the head of the snake” referring to Iran’s nuclear program.

The Arab Spring and the fall of several Saudi allies in the region further heightened the geopolitical rivalries between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The competition for leadership in the Middle East and the wider Islamic world with the Sunni-Shi’a undertone was apparent during the 2010s, with Iran and Saudi Arabia backing opposite factions in the civil wars in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

The disastrous consequences of the involvement in the civil war in Yemen, the inability to force Qatar into submission after the boycott in July 2017 and the 2019 Houthis attacks on the Saudi oil installations underlined the economic and political costs of the regional geopolitical entanglements for Saudi Arabia. The continued non-committal approach of the US in supporting Saudi Arabia against the Houthis prompted the Kingdom to reconsider its regional policies with a series of reconciliations, including with Qatar in 2021, Türkiye in 2022 and finally with Iran in 2023.

Before the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war, Saudi Arabia was reportedly actively considering normalisation with Israel. Speculations were rife about a possible US-mediated deal that would have formalised the implicit relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Just a few weeks before the October 7 attack, in an interview with Fox News, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had admitted that Riyadh was indeed in talks to explore “normalisation” with Israel, saying that “everyday we get closer” to a possible “historic” breakthrough.

Indeed, many believed that the Hamas attack was aimed at disrupting the potential Saudi-Israel normalisation. President Joe Biden said as much during his address to the nation on October 20, outlining his administration’s response to the unfolding crisis in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia was reportedly hoping for a greater US military commitment for the safety and security of the Kingdom, including a nuclear umbrella, and declaring Saudi Arabia as a major non-NATO ally of the US in return for establishing relations with Israel. Nonetheless, one of the major sticking points to a possible deal was the Saudi emphasis on not ignoring the Palestinian issue and Israel’s non-committal approach to the matter.

The Saudi approach was an extension of the Abraham Accords that had built upon the gradual rapprochement between the Gulf states and Israel under US backing. While the UAE and Bahrain had decided to establish diplomatic ties, Oman and Qatar preferred tacit relations. While closer to the latter, Saudi Arabia was engaged in diplomatic discussions with the US and Israel, exploring the possibilities of taking the rapprochement with Israel further.

The Saudi response to the Gaza crisis reflects its geopolitical interests as well as its quest to maintain its leadership position in the Arab and Islamic world. The Kingdom has been proactive in coalescing the Arab and Islamic response in condemning Israel for its policies in the Occupied Territories and the use of disproportionate force against Palestinians, causing massive civilian deaths, wide scale destruction of infrastructure and critical healthcare and educational facilities, and the humanitarian catastrophe in the Gaza Strip.

Riyadh convened an emergency meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (October 18, 2023) and a joint OIC-Arab League summit meeting (November 11, 2023). However, this did not necessarily lead to a “collective” Arab-Islamic response. The Saudi focus subsequently shifted to calling for an immediate ceasefire and end of fighting and expressing its commitment to finding a two-state solution.

The crisis has prompted Saudi Arabia to explicitly rule out normalisation with Israel until the resolution of the Palestinian issue.

Effectively, this means that the possibility of a Saudi-Israel normalisation is no longer on the anvil for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the crisis has led to the reinstatement of the Palestinian issue as one of the top priorities for Saudi regional and foreign policy based on its historic attempts rooted in the Arab Peace Initiative as reflected in the 1981 Fahd Plan and the 2002 Abdullah Plan.

Saudi Arabia has highlighted its commitment to the Palestinian cause by condemning Israeli actions, calling for an immediate ceasefire and arguing for finding a two-state solution. On September 28, 2024, while addressing the UN General Assembly, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan called for “finding concrete solutions” to the Palestinian suffering. He described the Israeli “bombing, murder, and destruction” in the Gaza Strip as a humanitarian catastrophe that needs to be immediately stopped.

Saudi Arabia has been highlighting its commitment to sending humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip and its reconstruction. Hence, in his UNGA address, Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan noted the Saudi commitment to extending support to the Palestinian people, saying that Riyadh has provided US$5 billion in humanitarian aid and that it is working towards a US$106 billion plan of humanitarian assistance through the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA).

As Iran and Israel are increasingly moving towards a war, Saudi Arabia and its GCC partners find themselves in a difficult situation. The disruptions in energy flows and maritime routes passing through the Bab al-Mandab and the Strait of Hormuz would mean serious economic costs that Saudi Arabia and other GCC states want to avoid. A war in the Gulf would incur huge financial losses and push back the mega developmental plans that the Saudis and others have unveiled in preparation for a post-oil future.

The economic costs notwithstanding, Saudi Arabia faces serious strategic challenges if Israel and Iran indeed enter into a war that would inevitably echo in the entire region. Saudi Arabia would prefer to avoid any possible Iranian retaliation that can compromise the safety and security of its economic infrastructure, including oil installations. Hence, it is unlikely to allow the use of its air space against Iran. Simultaneously, it will come under pressure from the US and Israel if they indeed decide to take the war to Iran. Geopolitically, a war in the Gulf would prove costly for Saudi Arabia as it would like to avoid taking sides and prefer a diplomatic solution wherein its strategic and economic interests are not harmed. 

As an Israel-Iran confrontation looms large, Saudi Arabia finds itself in a complicated situation wherein it will have to weigh both the immediate and the long-term political and economic costs. For now, Saudi Arabia would prefer to avoid a war and would likely take a considered position as the situation evolves. Indeed, the explosive situation in the Middle East would continue to test Riyadh’s political pragmatism and diplomatic prudence.

How would a potential war between Israel and Iran impact Saudi Arabia’s strategic position in the region?

Can India play a role in the evolving conflict between Israel and Iran amid the Gaza crisis?

How could a war between Israel and Iran affect India’s energy security, given that much of India’s oil supply comes from the Gulf region?

What would be the implications for India’s diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in the event of a wider conflict in West Asia?

(The author is an Associate Professor of Middle East studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Views are personal. @MuddassirQuamar)

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Read other articles from the series on Conflicts in West Asia:

Conflicts in West Asia: Israel-Iran war of abrasion

Conflicts in West Asia: A brief history of the Israel-Palestine conflict 

Conflicts in West Asia: Iraq in disarray

Conflicts in West Asia: Israel-Hamas war and the Yemen quagmire

Conflicts in West Asia: Kurds and their struggle with statelessness